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11 Introduction
Mobility of tax bases between tax jurisdictions gives rise to horizontal externalities that tend
to leave regional/state/national taxes too low. This standard wisdom is expressed forcefully
in the well-established models of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) (ZMW
hereafter): competition for mobile capital leads to too low capital taxes.1 The analysis in ZMW
has since been enriched in various directions to provide instances in which capital taxes may
be too high.2 These instances include:3 trade in capital- and labour-intensive goods (Wilson,
1987), large capital-importing countries (De Pater and Myers, 1994), large foreign ownership
of immobile factors (Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997), competition for amenities (Noiset, 1995,
and Wooders et. al., 2001), commonality of the capital tax base between states and federal
governments (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002), government failure (Edwards and Keen, 1996),
political economy considerations (Fuest and Huber, 2001, Kessler et al, 2002, Grazzini and van
Ypersele, 2003, and Lockwood and Makris, 2005).
In addition, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that higher capital mobility has
not clearly led to cuts in corporate tax rates, at least for OECD countries. In particular, recent
work by Hallerberg and Basinger (1998, 2001), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002),
Garrett (1998), Quinn (1997) Rodrik (1997), Swank and Steinmo (2002)) Þnd rather mixed
e ects4 of relaxation of capital controls on corporate tax rates.
1Low capital taxes may not be an exclusive characteristic of open economies, that compete for capital. As
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) emphasise, even when a closed economy is considered, in the long-run the
accumulated distortions on capital and labour, through the e ect of capital taxes on interest rates and wages,
dominate the distortions on labour, that arise from the e ect of labour income taxes on labour supply. So, the
optimal steady-state capital tax in a closed economy is zero.
2For an excellent recent survey see Wilson (1999).
3On a related topic, Kehoe (1989), by building on the capital levy problem discussed, for instance, in Fischer
(1980), has shown that an attempt to coordinate to higher taxes may not prove beneÞcial even if tax competition
leads to a ‘race to the bottom’, as long as governments cannot pre-commit to their tax policies. In such an
environment, an anticipation of coordination to higher taxes after savings have taken place will lead to low
savings and hence low aggregate capital stock in the Þrst place. On another related topic, Bucovetsky and
Wilson (1991) show that if tax authorities can deploy a savings, as well as a capital, tax then the resulting
policy mix is e!cient, and hence there is no scope for coordination.
4SpeciÞcally, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) is probably the most comprehensive, as it allows
for four di erent measures of exchange controls, and studies not only statutory rates of corporate tax, but
2Nevertheless, the message of the basic ZMW model and anecdotal evidence of capital
taxes in OECD countries seem to drive many of the debates for tax coordination. For instance,
OECD (1998) calls for countries to refrain from harmful tax competition.
This paper re-examines the standard view that capital taxes are too low when capital is
mobile across tax jurisdictions. It does so, by emphasising a previously neglected implication
of non-cooperative capital tax setting in a world with national currencies. SpeciÞcally, regional
governments compete with one another for mobile capital, as in standard models, but they
enjoy also revenues that arise from the inßation tax on residents’ real money holdings. Money
demand depends on income and the cost of holding money. These in turn depend on regional
tax policies. Capital taxes, then, give rise to an horizontal externality by a ecting foreign public
revenues from issuing national currency. This tax externality may lead, ceteris paribus, to too
high national capital taxes, and may more than o set the usual e ects of tax competition. In
this case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, national capital taxes will be too high. So, the
main result of this paper is that tax coordination, by means of a small multilateral increase in
the capital tax, may not lead to a welfare improvement relative to the non-cooperative outcome.
Arguably, seignorage accounts for a very small amount of government revenue. Nevertheless,
our result is based on the marginal e ects of local capital taxes on seignorage. In fact, it is
shown that the direction of a welfare improving multilateral change in capital taxes depends
critically on the interest-elasticity of the demands for capital and real money balances, on the
income-elasticity of money demand, and on whether policies are discretionary.
The organisation of the paper is the following. Next Section presents the basic model.
Section 3 examines some benchmark environments, while Section 4 investigates whether non-
cooperative capital taxes are too low or too high. Section 5 discusses some extensions to the
basic model, and Section 6 concludes.
also e ective marginal and average rates, for almost all OECD countries, and allows for strategic interaction in
corporate tax setting between countries. It Þnds that depending on the choice of measure of capital controls
and corporate tax rates, a unilateral or multilateral liberalisation of controls may lower or raise corporate taxes.
This is broadly consistent with the Þndings of Quinn (1997), Rodrik (1997), Garrett (1998) and Swank and
Steinmo (2002) who simply Þnd that capital controls have no signiÞcant e ect.
32 The Model
To present the basic argument in the simplest possible manner, we deploy a stylised model
which abstracts from many features of empirical reality. How our basic argument might be
modiÞed in a more general framework is discussed in Section 5.
Our framework is the standard capital taxation model of ZMW, appropriately modiÞed
to incorporate money holdings and an inßation tax set by national central banks. There are
n > 1 symmetric countries. Taxes and public spending in each country are set by the Þscal
branch of the national government. Each country has its own national currency, in the form
of Þat money, which is managed by the national monetary authority, the country’s central
bank (CB hereafter). We will refer hereafter to the Þscal and monetary branches of a national
government jointly as the (consolidated) government.
Each country j = 1,...,n is populated by a representative household. There is a single,
composite and traded good, and no uncertainty. There is also a world market for bonds. It is
assumed that there are no transaction costs or restrictions in trading in this market. That is,
there is perfect capital mobility. Let   denote the real interest rate in this market.5
To capture the basic workings in place we also deploy a two-period model, where each
country is endowed with e units of the single good.6 Moreover, the basic model postulates that
the single good is produced in each and every jurisdiction by means of combining capital and
a Þxed factor, like land. The case of capital being combined, for production purposes, with an
endogenous but immobile across jurisdictions factor is discussed in Section 5.
We assume that governments do not possess an unrestricted lump-sum tax. So, in the
basic model tax authorities do not tax the Þxed factor. The case of governments taxing the
income from the Þxed factor at a rate ! > 0, which is less than the unrestricted optimal one,
is discussed in Section 5. One reason for governments facing restriction in their ability to use
5The law of one price, the Fisher parity condition and the uncovered interest rate parity conditions, that
ensure no arbitrage in the markets for the single good and for (real or nominal, domestic or foreign) assets,
imply that the real interest rate is common for all countries.
6Our aim in this paper is not to study the use of money, the associated inßation dynamics and the implications
for the intertemporal consumption smoothing behaviour of agents. Our aim instead is to investigate how the
predictions of the ZMW model, which came to be the workhorse in the capital tax competition literature, are
modiÞed once one takes into account the presence of seignorage. For this reason the investigation of a fully
dynamic model is out of the scope of the present paper, and is left for future research.
4lump-sum taxes is that administratively feasible forms of such taxes would not be politically
feasible. A typical example here is the poll tax in Great Britain imposed by Margaret Thatcher,
which is largely viewed as one of the reasons for her having been driven out of o!ce.7 We also
assume that a tax on savings is not available. This assumption is motivated from the fact that
in practice it is di!cult to tax capital income on a residence basis, due to administrative and
tax compliance problems associated with taxing foreign-source income.8
Each and every government possesses a per-unit tax on capital employed domestically. In
addition, public spending takes the form of local public good provision. Assume, for simplicity,
that governments do not inherit any debt or money liabilities; that is, the ”initial” private
holdings of money and public debt are zero. Governments, however, can issue public debt
in the Þrst period, i.e. they may enter the capital market. In the Þrst period, the typical
government can also issue domestic currency.
Expressed in real terms, denote with "j the level of Þrst-period public good, which is
Þnanced through issues of public debt and money. Let dj and ¯ mj be the (real) levels of
public debt and money supply in country j (in the Þrst period). Notice that the government’s
(second-period) debt liabilities are (1 +  )dj. Issues of money create also liabilities for the
consolidated government in the second period. In more detail, assume without loss of generality,
as countries are symmetric, that foreign private holdings of domestic currency are not feasible.
Also, governments are assumed for simplicity to hold no foreign reserves. Then, the Þrst-period
real revenue the government acquires from money creation is ¯ mj, often referred to as the cash-
ßow measure of seignorage. At the end of the second period, the government, through the
central bank, buys back the outstanding nominal money stock. Let #j denote inßation. The
government’s (second-period) real liability due to money creation is then equal to (1  #j)¯ mj.
Note thus that the inßation rate is e ectively a tax on real money balances ¯ mj. Let gj be
the (real) level of second-period public good. So, the second-period revenue requirements are
gj + (1   #j)¯ mj + (1 +  )dj. These requirements are Þnanced through capital taxes. Denote
with tj and kj the tax on and the level of capital in country j (in the second period).
7See for instance Wilson (1999).
8For a model where the degree of information sharing between tax authorities is endogenously determined to
be zero, which in turn implies that residents do not, in e ect, face a tax on their capital income upon repatriation,
i.e. a tax on their savings, see Makris (2003).
5The government’s Þrst- and second-period budget constraints are, respectively,
"j = dj + ¯ mj (1)
gj = tjkj   ¯ mj(1   #j)   dj(1 +  ), (2)
which give rise to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint
gj = tjkj + ¯ mj(#j +  )   "j(1 +  ). (3)
To interpret this constraint note that total public good provision, in terms of second-period
good, is gj +"j(1+ ). Recall that issues of money are used to buy units of the single good in
the Þrst period to Þnance public good production. Note, however, that issuing money amounts
also to switching from interest-bearing, i.e. public debt, to non-interest-bearing means of
Þnancing public good production. This constitutes a gain for the consolidated government and
is captured in the term  ¯ mj. Recall also that inßation is, in e ect, a tax on the real money
balances, giving rise to inßation tax revenues of #j ¯ mj units. So, manipulation of money supply
gives rise to total real revenues of (  + #j)¯ mj units, in second-period terms. We call this
hereafter as (the opportunity or stock measure of) seignorage.9
Policy-setters are assumed to be benevolent: they choose policies to maximise the welfare
of their representative household. National Þscal policies consist of {gj,tj,"j} and they are
chosen by the national Þscal authorities. Monetary policies are set by the national CB. What
constitutes monetary policy in our model is discussed shortly after.
Note that in our basic model, due to the immobile factor being Þxed and the unavailability
of lump-sum taxes, we e ectively abstain from labour income taxes. However, in all OECD
countries a big part of government revenue derives from taxes on wage income. Thus, in Section
5 we also discuss how our basic result is a ected by the availability of such taxes.
We turn to the description of the private sector in the typical country. Private production
in country j takes place by means of a production function f(kj) with the standard properties
f(0) = 0,f0 > 0,f00 < 0. Capital kj is bought in the capital market, and does not depreciate
after its use. Rents, i.e. payments to the Þxed factor, are thus given by f(kj) ( +tj)kj, and
the demand for capital follows from the standard proÞt-maximisation condition
f0(kj) =   + tj. (4)
9See Walsh (2003) Chs 4.2 for various deÞnitions of seignorage, and especially, for our purposes, pp. 139-140.
6So, capital is a decreasing function of the gross rate of interest   + tj, kj = k(  + tj) with
k0 = 1/f00(kj). Also, equilibrium returns to the immobile factors wj are a decreasing function
of the gross interest rate: wj = w( +tj) with w0 =  kj and w( +tj) ! f(k( +tj)) f0(k( +
tj))k(  + tj).
Restricting our attention to non-negative net real interest rates, i.e.   " 0, we have that
the typical household allocates its endowment e to Þrst-period consumption qj and savings
sj = e   qj. Savings consist of real money holdings mj and bonds bj = sj   mj. In the second
period, the household liquidates money holdings, and receives its return from investment and
the equilibrium returns to the immobile factors. These three sources of income comprise second-
period consumption,
cj = (1 +  )bj + mj(1   #j) + w(  + tj)
= (1 +  )sj + w(  + tj)   (#j +  )mj. (5)
As it is well-known, explaining demand for Þat money in an analytically tractable way
is notoriously di!cult. For this reason, existing models with money largely fall into two, ad-
mittedly simplistic, categories. There are those models where money is a necessary exchange
medium; the cash-in-advance models. There are also the money-in-utility models which pos-
tulate that individuals derive utility from real money holdings, as the latter economise on
transaction costs (e.g. shopping time) associated with purchases. These models yield similar
predictions, which also comply with empirical evidence, about the demand for liquidity.10
Here we focus on the role of money as a medium of exchange that reduces transaction
costs. In Section 5 we discuss how our results would be modiÞed if we assumed, instead, the
existence of a cash-in-advance constraint.
When money enters the utility function, individuals are viewed as beneÞting from the
ßow of services yielded by money holdings. These services can be thought of as a description of
the advantages of intermediate exchange. These advantages arise from the fact that converting
illiquid assets to purchasing power and arranging barter transactions are costly, in terms of
time and resources, activities. So, what matters, in terms of welfare, is the command of money
holdings over goods or some measure of the transaction services, in terms of the single good,
that money holdings provide. Thus, the utility derived from the ßow of services yielded by
10See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) Ch 4, Obstfeld and Rogo  (1996) Chs 8.1-8.3 and Walsh (2003) Chs 2
and 3 for some excellent discussions of the issues involved.
7money holdings is related to the value, in terms of the single good, of money holdings. In fact,
models with money in utility can be viewed as shortcuts of models where money helps to reduce
the time needed to purchase consumption goods.11
In the context of our model, the presumption is that households gain utility from the
real money balances they have at the start of the (second) period,12 by economising on the
transaction costs that are involved in purchasing consumption goods at the end of the period.
So, we postulate the following preferences
H(qj)V (cj,mj(1   #j))"("j,gj), (6)
where13 H(0) = 0,H0 > 0,H00 < 0,"(0,0) = 0,"  > 0, g > 0,    < 0, gg < 0. The14
dependence of welfare on m(1    ) requires an explanation. Following Carlstrom and Fuest
(2001) we assume that money balances available before going to purchase goods facilitate
transactions and thereby yield utility.15 So, the second-period real money balances, i.e. how
many units of the single good can be purchased in the second period with the nominal money
holdings acquired in the Þrst period, are r ! m(1    ). We16 also assume that V (0,0) = 0,
Vc > 0, Vr > 0, Vcc < 0, and VrVcc < VrcVc. Conditioned on the satisfaction of the second-order
su!cient condition, the latter assumption is necessary and su!cient for real money balances
11For a cash-in-advance model where money is required also for transactions involving investment see Abel
(1985).
12See also Lucas (1982) and Carlstrom and Fuest (2001).
13Utility is assumed to be separable in the Þrst-period consumption for expositional simplicity only; relaxing
this assumption will not a ect the qualitative nature of our results.
14Lettered subscripts are used to denote respective partial derivatives.
15In fact, this assumption makes the timing of acquiring and using money more consistent with cash-in-advance
models.
16Utility is assumed to be separable in the public good to prevent money demand from being a ected by
the level of public good provision. Relaxing this assumption would complicate the analysis without altering
signiÞcantly the main message of the paper. In more detail, with non-separable utility the equilibrium level of
second-period public good provision in region j becomes a non-linear function of revenues from capital taxation,
the price of money  j +!, interest rate !, private wealth (1+!)e+wj and Þrst-period public good. Our results
would be qualitatively robust as long as the stability condition 1 > (  + !)"m/"g was imposed. This condition
would ensure that higher capital tax revenues were still implying higher levels of local public good provision.
Notice also that a similar separability assumption has also been deployed by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) to
ensure that tax revenues from labour income do not in turn depend on the level of local public good provision.
8to be a normal good.
Let the net-of-taxes wealth be denoted with hj. That is, hj = (1 + !)e + wj. The house-
hold’s intertemporal budget constraint is qj(1 + !) + cj + mj( j + !) = hj. Let zj !  j + !
denote the j country cost of holding money, and "j ! 1     be the rate of return to money.
Standard consumer theory then tells us that savings in each and every country j are given by
a function #(!,zj,wj,"j,e) with #e > 0 and #w < 0 - by normality of consumption and real
money balances, #z < 0 - if consumption and real money balances are normal goods and gross
substitutes - and #!(.) > 0 representing the net e"ect due to an increase in the price of past
consumption - if current and future consumptions are normal goods and gross substitutes. Fur-
thermore, #" is ambiguous. Also, by the normality of consumption and real money balances,
we have that (1+!)#w +1 > 0. Given that equilibrium rents are a function of the net interest
rate and the capital tax, we have that savings in country j are ultimately given by a function
s(!,tj, j).17 Let us denote with s! the e"ect on savings of the typical country of a marginal
increase in the after-tax real interest rate, i.e. s! ! #! + #z   #wkj. Assume hereafter that
s! > 0. Denote also with s# and st the e"ect on savings of the typical country of a marginal
increase in inßation and capital tax respectively. Note that s# = #z   #" is ambiguous, while
st =  #wk > 0.
Welfare maximisation subject to the budget constraint (5) for given prices and policies,
gives also a demand for liquidity which is increasing with disposable income yj ! (1 + !)sj +
w(!+tj) ! y(!,tj,sj), as money here is a normal good, and decreasing with the relative price
of holding money, ! +  j. Money demand also depends, in an ambiguous manner, on 1    j,
i.e. the real interest rate on money holdings. In more detail, assuming that the second order
su!cient condition is satisÞed, optimal money holdings, when !+ j > 0, satisfy the following
Þrst order condition of the household’s problem:
Vr(cj,mj(1    j)) =
(! +  j)
1    j
Vc(cj,mj(1    j)). (7)
This condition,18 combined with the second-period budget constraint (5), gives a money de-
mand mj = m(! +  j,yj,1    j), with mz < 0 and my > 0, while m" is ambiguous.
17The dependence on the endowment e is suppressed for expositional clarity.
18Note that, given the second order conditions, this condition gives a demand for real money balances which is
decreasing with the nominal interest rate i (=
 +!
1 !), increasing with the level of consumption c, and decreasing
with the real interest rate of money 1    .
9Recall that disposable income is a function of the interest rate, the returns to the immobile
factors and thereby the interest rate and the capital tax, and, Þnally, of savings. Thus mj =
m(! +  j,y(!,tj,s(!,tj, j)),1    j) ! l(!,tj, j). Clearly, given savings, demand for money
is decreasing with capital taxes, as higher taxes decrease disposable income. Furthermore,
demand for real money balances is increasing with savings, as disposable income increases with
savings. Recall that savings increase with the capital tax due to normality of consumption. To
see the net e"ect of capital taxes on money demand, note that lt =  kmy[(1 + !)#w + 1] < 0,
due to normality. So, the overall e"ect of capital taxes on the demand for money (through the
disposable income) is negative as, due to normality, the direct e"ect of a tax-induced decrease
in the returns to the immobile factors on disposable income dominates the indirect e"ect on
disposable income through the associated decrease in savings. Also, l# = mz m"+my(1+!)s#,
which has an ambiguous sign. It will also prove useful for what follows to investigate the e"ect
on liquidity of changes in the real interest rate. Increases in the latter result, ceteris paribus,
in higher price of money and hence in lower real money balances. At the same time, however,
an increase in the real interest rate has an ambiguous e"ect on the disposable income, for given
savings, as it increases the returns from savings but it also decreases the returns to the immobile
factors. Finally, an increase in the real interest rate increases savings, disposable income and
thereby demand for money. So, the e"ect on liquidity of changes in the real interest rate is
ambiguous. In more detail, l! = mz + my[s   k + (1 + !)s!].
Given the above, the value function of typical agent in country j is
U(!,tj, j,$j,gj) ! H(e s(!,tj, j))V (y(!,tj,s(!,tj, j)) (!+ j)l(!,tj, j),l(!,tj, j)(1  j)) ($j,gj),
(8)
with - due to the envelope theorem:
U! = [sj   kj   mj]VcH , (9)
Ut =  kjVcH , (10)
U# =  mj[Vc + Vr]H . (11)
Equilibrium in the market for capital is given by
X
j
k(! + tj) =
X
j
(sj   $j). (12)
To understand this note that the left-hand side corresponds to total demand for capital by
Þrms. Total supply on the other hand consists of private purchases of bonds net of private
10purchases of public bonds, i.e.
P
j(bj   dj). Thus, after using the deÞnition of savings, the
government’s Þrst-period budget constraint and money-market equilibrium mj = ¯ mj, total
supply is equal to
P
j(sj  mj  dj) =
P
j(sj  $j). With savings depending on the real interest
rate, inßation and the capital tax, market-clearing implies an equilibrium real interest rate
! = !(~ t,~  ,~ $), where ~ t ! {t1,...,tn}, ~   ! { 1,..., n} and ~ $ ! {$1,...,$n}. Note that in a
symmetric equilibrium we have
k(! + t) = s(!,  + !,w(! + t),1    ,e)   $, (13)
and thus ! = p(t, ,$). Note that, evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium,





$!(~ t,~ #,~  )
$#j =
p2
n , with the sign of p2 be ambiguous.
Equilibrium in the market for money is given by19
¯ mj = l(!(~ t,~  ,~ $),tj, j). (14)
Thus, given capital-market clearing, equilibrium inßation depends on capital taxes and Þrst-
period public goods, foreign inßations and the regional money supply. Recall, from the de-
scription of the consumer’s value function, that inßation a"ects consumer’s welfare. Also,
given ! = !(~ t,~  ,~ $), from what a"ects welfare, inßation is the only variable that the CB has
control upon, through the manipulation of the money supply ¯ mj. Therefore, inßation is the
ultimate variable of interest to the CB: the CB’s policy goal is inßation. For this reason, we
treat inßation as the direct instrument of monetary policy. This assumption does not mean
that the CB directly sets prices in the economy. Instead, it should be interpreted as the CB,
through its actual policy tools, being able to exercise close control over inßation. In terms of
our model, this simply means that the CB adjusts, residually, the money stock ¯ mj so that, for
any given regional Þscal policies, foreign inßations and any chosen inßation target, the market
for money clears given the associated total demand for money. Note, also, that in the context
of our model, the money aggregate ¯ mj is not a good policy goal. The reason is that if money
supply is set at a certain level by the CB, then inßation will also be inßuenced by regional
taxes and Þrst-period public goods, through the interest rate. That is, if the CB deploys a
money aggregate target/goal then it, e"ectively, looses the close control of inßation - the CB’s
19Given equilibrium in the markets for money and capital, the market for the single, composite and traded
good in the second period clears residually, i.e.
P
j(cj + gj) =
P
j(f(kj) + kj).
11ultimate variable of interest.20 For these reasons, we assume that in our model, as it is also the
case in UK, for instance, the CB’s target/goal is inßation, and not the money supply. That is,
we assume hereafter that the CB chooses inßation to maximise welfare in its jurisdiction.21
Given the symmetry of our model we focus on symmetric equilibria. We also focus on
situations where Þscal authorities hold Nash conjectures against each other, to capture non-
cooperative tax-setting. Similarly, CBs hold Nash conjectures against each other, to capture
non-cooperative monetary policies.
Equilibrium characterisation will also depend on whether policy is discretionary or not.
Pre-commitment of policies amounts to policy-makers being able to abide by their policy an-
nouncements/rules, while policies are discretionary when they are set after consumers have
made their decisions. Absent enforcement, it may be optimal, in many instances, to deviate
from a policy rule once individuals have made commitments based on the expectation that the
rule will be upheld. Thus, if policy-makers can exercise discretion, private decisions will have
to take into account the incentives of the policy makers once private commitments take place.
In our context, whether policy is discretionary or not amounts to whether policy-makers
can commit or not on their policies prior to individuals deciding on their savings and money
holdings. In our model, the distinction between pre-commitment and discretion is important
because inßation and tax policies distort savings and the demand for real money balances. In
more detail, recall that savings and the demand for money depend, among others, on the price
of money holdings. As the price of money,   + !, depends on inßation (directly) and capital
taxes (indirectly via the real interest rate), policies distort individual decisions. So, optimally
announced policies (when savings and money holdings are not yet determined) are in general
di erent to ex post optimal policies (when savings and real money balances are in place). This
20In reality, of course, even the money aggregate is out of the CB’s close control due to monetary shocks.
In fact, for this reason, money growth is usually an intermediate target, which only provides the central bank
with information about economic developments that will a ect the goal variables. Given this and other relevant
information, the CB then manipulates its policy instruments/tools in an attempt to reach the adopted policy
goals. For a discussion of monetary (intermediate) targets, goals, and policy instruments/tools see Walsh (2003)
Ch. 9.
21If we ignored the distinction between goals and tools/instruments and assumed that the CB chooses the
money aggregate, instead of inßation, then capital taxes would generate the usual horizontal externality empha-
sised by ZMW and an externality due to the presence of seignorage, which however is di erent than the one we
emphasise here. SpeciÞcally, this externality would arise from tax-induced changes in foreign inßation.
12is a mere consequence of the fact that from the point of view of policy-makers savings and
money demand are inÞnitely inelastic ex post, and therefore policy-distortions upon savings
and money holdings are lower ex post than ex ante.22
In what follows, we assume that the typical Þscal government and central bank possess
the same ability to pre-commit. We do so in order to isolate the e!ciency implications for
decentralised tax policy of the mere existence of national monetary authorities in control of
national inßation. Introducing an asymmetry vis-a-vis pre-commitment technologies would
bring about additional considerations,23 and would obscure the picture, without altering the
main insights of our paper.
In terms of our model, if pre-commitment of policies is feasible then (all) policy-setters
take into account, when deciding upon policy, that mj = l( ,tj,!j) and sj = s( ,tj,!j),
and hence   =  (~ t,~ !,~ "). If, on the other hand, policies are discretionary then mj and sj are
treated by policy-makers as exogenously given. So, under discretion, policies are chosen as if






in a rational expectations equilibrium, individuals can foresee the actual policies. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the demand for money l( (~ t,~ !,~ "),tj,!j) and savings s( (~ t,~ !,~ "),tj,!j) must still
be satisÞed. To capture in a concise way the di erent incentives on the part of policy-makers,
we follow hereafter the notational convention that mj = ˆ l( ,tj,!j) and sj = ˆ s( ,tj,!j) with
ˆ lµ = ˆ sµ = 0 if policy-makers can exercise discretion, and ˆ lµ = lµ and ˆ sµ = sµ otherwise, where
µ =  ,t,!. Also,   = ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ ") with ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ ") =  (~ t,~ !,~ ") if policy-makers can pre-commit, while





if policies must be credible. Furthermore,
we denote the symmetric equilibrium interest rate by ˆ p(t,!,"), with ˆ pt(t,!,") = ˆ st k0
k0 ˆ s  and
ˆ p!(t,!,") = ˆ s!
k0 ˆ s .
Finally note that as the typical monetary and tax authorities face the same objective
function a direct application of the envelope theorem implies that the sequence of the moves
between the typical CB and the typical Þscal authority is not crucial for policy determination.
In fact, non-cooperative tax and monetary policy is given by maximising the typical resident’s
22For some excellent discussions of the dynamic, or time, inconsistency problem of policies, see Blanchard and
Fischer (1989) Ch 11.4, Persson and Tabellini (2000) Ch 12.2 and 15, and Walsh (2003) Ch. 8.. Note also that
the implicit assumption here, as in all models of capital tax competition, including Kehoe (1989), is that tax
authorities can commit on their capital taxes prior to capital stock being decided upon by Þrms.
23See for instance Huber (1998), Dixit and Lambertini (2003).
13welfare with respect to tj,"j and !j, taking into account that mj = ˆ l( ,tj,!j), sj = ˆ s( ,tj,!j)
and   = ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ ").
The objective function of the typical CB and tax authorities, or equivalently of the typical
consolidated government, can then be written as:
W(~ t,~ !,~ ")   U(ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ "),tj,!j,"j,tjk(ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ ")+tj)+(ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ ")+!j)ˆ l(ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ "),tj,!j)!(1+ˆ  (~ t,~ !,~ "))"j).
(15)
Before we proceed to the investigation of the equilibrium tax policies, it will be helpful for
our understanding to examine the Þrst-best allocations, and the optimal inßation policy when
regional governments can fully-utilise a lump-sum tax. We do so next.
3 Benchmark Cases
In this Section we investigate some benchmark cases that will help our understanding of the
forthcoming results. We start with the examination of the Þrst-best allocations.
Since regions are symmetric there is no reason for di erentiating between them. Thus,
in Þrst-best qj = q, cj = c, "j = ", gj = g, rj = r and kj = k for any j = 1,...,n. Also, since
capital is productive, we have that k = e ! q ! ". Thus, the Þrst-best second-period private
and public consumptions and the Þrst-best real money holdings in the typical region are given
by
max
q,c,",g,rH(q)V (c,r)"(",g) subject to c + g " e ! q ! " + f(e ! q ! ") (16)
where the latter inequality is the second-period resource constraint of the typical region.
Clearly then, as the marginal cost of issuing money is zero, the optimal quantity of
money is the one that satiates consumers, i.e. Vr = 0.24 Also, as consumption is valued and
the marginal rate of transformation between the second-period private and public good is one,
in the Þrst-best there are no wasted resources and the marginal utilities of second-period private
and public consumption are equalised, i.e. c + g = e ! q ! " + f(e ! q ! ") and "gV = Vc".
Similarly, we have that the Þrst-best levels of Þrst-period private and public consumption are
given by H0V = HVc(1 + f0) and H"" = H0". Denote Þrst-best values with the superscript o.
In the absence of a central planner, taxes have to be used to transfer private resources
into public good production. In addition, manipulation of monetary policy may be necessary
24See also Blanchard and Fischer (1989) pp. 191 and Walsh (2003) pp. 60.
14to raise revenues further for the purposes of Þnancing local public goods. Suppose, for the
purposes of the rest of this Section, that local Þscal authorities can fully utilise an unrestricted
lump-sum tax $. That is, let private consumptions in region j be such that cj = (1+ )(e qj)+
wj !j ("+ )mj. Public consumptions in turn are such that gj+(1+ )#j = !j+( +")mj :
given the availability of unrestricted lump-sum taxes, it is not optimal for local governments
to use any distortionary taxes, including capital taxes. Note now that optimisation by Þrms
and consumers implies   = f0(kj) and H0V = HVc(1 + f0). The latter, as in the Þrst-best,
states that the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between Þrst- and second-
period consumptions are equalised. As condition (7) still determines the trade-o  between
consumption and real money holdings, we have directly that optimal money holdings decrease
with income, and hence the CB’s revenues are negatively related to the lump-sum income
taxes. Moreover, money holdings decrease with the cost of holding money   + ". In addition,
equilibrium in the capital market, and the symmetry of countries, imply that kj = k, qj = q,
cj = c, #j = #, gj = g, !j = ! and k = e   q   #.
Consider now the benchmark case of the national lump-sum tax and inßation being
chosen by a central consolidated government. Note that with the opportunity cost of money
" +   being equal to zero consumers acquire money up to the point of satiation. Recall that
equalisation of the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between Þrst- and second-
period consumptions, money-satiation and equalisation of the marginal utilities of private and
public consumption is the Þrst-best outcome. One can very easily conÞrm that the Þrst-best
allocations are feasible. In fact, given money-satiation, all the government needs to do is to
set public spending #o, go and lump-sum tax !o ! #o(1 + f0(e   qo   #o)) + go. Clearly, then,
the optimal rate of inßation would be a rate of deßation equal to the real rate of interest, i.e.
" =   .
Setting inßation rate such that the private opportunity cost of money is zero, i.e. equal
to the social marginal cost of printing money, is the famous Friedman rule for optimal inßation
derived in Friedman (1969). However, zero nominal interest rates may no longer be optimal
if the consolidated government does not possess a lump-sum tax instrument. The reason is
that in this case variations in inßation tax revenues to achieve the Friedman rule will require
adjustments in other distortionary taxes. In fact, when money is treated as a commodity, as it
is done here, the optimal mix between inßation tax and other distortionary taxes follows the
15well-known Ramsey rule.25
In the next Sections, we assume away the availability of unrestricted lump-sum taxes,
and focus on the e!ciency properties of regional capital taxes. As we shall see, some of the
ine!ciencies that arise in this case rely on the nominal interest rate be positive. Deriving the
exact conditions for the latter to be true is out of the scope of the present study. Nevertheless,
in an environment where regional distortionary taxes are set non-cooperatively, many of the
lessons of the literature on optimal taxation in monetary models are still valid. In more detail,
one can show that, as intuition would suggest, the optimal, from the CB’s point of view,
revenue from issuing money is positive as long as public consumption is su!ciently valued.
But positive revenues from issuing money require positive nominal interest rates and positive
demand for money. Therefore, in what follows we focus on environments where the public
good and real money balances are su!ciently valued so that the symmetric non-cooperative
equilibrium features positive cost of holding money and positive money holdings.
4 Capital Taxation in the Presence of Seignorage
We are now ready to investigate the equilibrium capital tax policies.26 At an interior solution,
the typical capital tax t is given by
 W(~ t,~ !,~ ")





+k]+V (c,r)"g(#,g){[tk0+m #+("+ )ˆ l#]
ˆ pt
n
+k+tk0+("+ )ˆ lt}} = 0.
(17)
We are now ready to analyse the e!ciency of the typical regional capital tax policy and hence
whether a coordinated change in regional taxes, for the given equilibrium level of inßation and
Þrst-period public good, is welfare improving or not. In doing so, the presumption is that the
equilibrium tax t, cost of holding money   + ", real money balances and Þrst-period public
25For an excellent discussion of the literature on the optimal rate of inßation, and the literature on optimal
taxation in monetary economies, see Walsh (2003) Chs. 2.3 and 4.4.3.
26We abstain from investigating the policies regarding the Þrst-period public good, as our focus is on capital
taxes. Note, however, that the net rate of return also depends on the Þrst-period public good of each juris-
diction. Thus, the non-cooperative choice of Þrst-period local public good imposes its own externalities on the
households and governments outside the region through its e ect on the rate of return. The investigation of
these externalities is out of the scope of the present work. See also Jensen and Toma (1991).
16good, #, are strictly positive.27 We also assume hereafter that public debt, d = #   m, is
non-negative.28
To start with, note that at a symmetric equilibrium welfare (15) becomes:
W(t,",#) ! U(ˆ p(t,",#),t,",#,tk(ˆ p(t,",#)+t)+("+ˆ p(t,",#))ˆ l(ˆ p(t,",#),t,") (1+ˆ p(t,",#))#).
(18)
A marginal increase in the uniform capital tax t results in:
Wt(t,",#) =  H(q)"(#,g)Vc(c,r)[(m   #)pt + k]
+H(q)V (c,r)"g(#,g){[tk0 + m   # + (" +  )ˆ l#]ˆ pt + k + tk0 + (" +  )ˆ lt}
= (1   1/n) × (19)
{ˆ ptH(q){[(m   #)(V (c,r)"g(#,g)   "(#,g)Vc(c,r)) + V (c,r)"g(#,g)(tk0 + (" +  )ˆ l#)]}}
! Wt,
where the last equality follows from using (17). A coordinated increase in symmetric capital
taxes t is welfare improving if and only if Wt > 0. If Wt > 0 then the net tax externality
is positive, and the non-cooperative equilibrium is characterised by under-taxation of capital,
for the given equilibrium level of inßation and Þrst-period public good. If, on the other hand,
Wt < 0 then the net tax externality is negative, and the non-cooperative equilibrium capital
taxes are too high. As, by assumption n > 1, we clearly have that the direction of ine!ciency
in the equilibrium capital tax depends on the balance between the terms in the curly brackets.
The term ˆ ptH(q)V (c,r)"g(#,g)tk0 > 0 represents the positive externality that arises from
the e ect on capital tax revenues abroad of tax-induced changes in the real interest rate. To
see this, note that the marginal e ect on capital tax revenues of a change in price of capital
is negative, tk0 < 0. As interest rates decrease with capital taxes, i.e. ˆ pt < 0, we have that
an increase in the capital tax leads to a decrease in tax revenues. As tax revenues are valued,
i.e. "g(#,g) > 0, this constitutes a positive externality, which leaves, ceteris paribus, taxes
too low. Note that the extend of this externality is positively related to the responsiveness of
capital to the before-tax real interest rate   + t. This is the standard horizontal externality
27Recall from the previous Section that su!ciently strong preferences for public good and su!ciently high
marginal utility of money at zero holdings would ensure all these presumptions.
28Su!ciently high valuation for Þrst-period public good would ensure that. Note also that the results would
remain the same, qualitatively, if governments were running su!ciently small surpluses.
17that arises due to the mobility of capital, and has been emphasised in the ZMW model. We
call this the tax-competition e ect.
The term  ˆ ptH(q)#(V (c,r)"g(#,g)   "(#,g)Vc(c,r)) represents the net externality that
arises from the e ect on disposable income, for given savings, and servicing of the Þrst-period
public good abroad of tax-induced changes in the real interest rate. To start with, the term
#ˆ ptH(q)"(#,g)Vc(c,r) " 0 reßects the negative externality that arises from the e ect on foreign
private consumption, for given savings, money holdings and price of money. In more detail,
note that a change in the interest rate a ects the return to savings and the return to immobile
factors. In fact, the net e ect of a marginal decrease in the interest rate on disposable income,
for given savings, is s k. Equilibrium in the capital market implies that the di erence between
private savings and investment equals the government’s Þrst-period total, interest- and non-
interest-bearing, real debt, i.e. s   k = d + m = #. So, an increase in the capital tax leads
to a decrease in disposable income of  ˆ pt# units. As consumption is valued, i.e. Vc > 0, this
constitutes a negative externality, that leads, ceteris paribus, to too high taxes. The term
 #ˆ ptH(q)V (c,r)"g(#,g) # 0 represents the positive externality that arises from the e ect on
the servicing of the government’s total real liabilities. To see this, note that the marginal e ect
on the second-period net tax revenues of a change in price of capital is  # " 0. As interest
rates decrease with capital taxes, we have that an increase in the capital tax leads to an
increase in second-period tax revenues by improving the Þscal position of the government. As
tax revenues are valued, this constitutes a positive externality, which leaves, ceteris paribus,
taxes too low. Note that both these externalities emerge due to the provision of a public
good in the Þrst-period. The net direction of this externality is positive if second-period
public good is valued more than private consumption, and vice versa.29 So, if, for instance,
V (c,r)"g(#,g) > "(#,g)Vc(c,r) then this externality leads, ceteris paribus, to too low taxes.
We call this the debt e ect.
The remaining terms capture the externalities that arise due to the presence of money.
To start with, the term  mˆ ptH(q)"(#,g)Vc(c,r) > 0 reßects the positive externality that
arises from the e ect on foreign private consumption, for given disposable income and money
holdings, of tax-induced changes in the price of real money balances. SpeciÞcally, note that a
marginal increase in the real interest rate, while maintaining income and real money balances,
29See also Jensen and Toma (1991).
18decreases consumption by the amount of real money holdings m. As interest rates decrease
with capital taxes, we thus have that an increase in the capital tax leads to an increase in
private consumption. As consumption is valued, this constitutes a positive externality, which
leads to too low taxes, and thereby reinforces the tax-competition e ect.
To understand the remaining term H(q)V (c,r)"g(#,g) ˆ pt[m + (" +  )ˆ l#], note Þrst that
(" +  )l( ,t,") is the seignorage, in a symmetric equilibrium, of each and every national
government. The existence of such revenue is the source of an horizontal externality, as national
governments do not take into account the full e ect of their tax choices on foreign CBs’ revenues
by a ecting the world interest rate. In more detail, a decrease in the real interest rate decreases
the gain on the part of the government, in terms of servicing liabilities, by switching from
interest- to non-interest-bearing means of Þnancing the Þrst-period public good. Thus, an
increase in the capital tax reduces seignorage, which is valued as a source of revenues for the
provision of the second-period public good. This negative externality, which is captured by
H(q)V (c,r)"g(#,g)ˆ ptm < 0, pushes towards too high taxes, counteracting the tax-competition
e ect. A decrease in the real interest rate a ects also the demand for liquidity. Recall, however,
from Section 2, that the e ect of the real interest rate on demand for money is ambiguous.
Thus, the net externality that arises from the existence of seignorage is of ambiguous direction.
These two e ects comprise what we refer to, hereafter, as the seignorage e ect.
Our main concern is to identify conditions under which there is scope for a coordinated
decrease in capital taxes. Whether taxes are too high depends on the balance of the seignorage,
the debt and tax competition e ects. Recall that ˆ l# = ˆ mz + ˆ my[# + (1 +  )ˆ s#]. Obviously,
then, which e ect dominates will depend on the elasticity of capital, the price- and income-
elasticities of real money balances and the relative valuation of the second-period public good.
Denote with ˆ $y the income-elasticity of the demand for liquidity,
y
m ˆ my, when policies are set,
and with % the tax-elasticity of the demand for capital, % !  tk0
k . Note also that at an interior
solution with positive price of real money holdings, inßation is given by
 W(~ t,~ !,~ ")
 !j = 0, which
evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium is:
 H(q)Vc(c,r)"(#,g)[(m   #)
ˆ p!
n
+ m]   H(q)Vr(c,r)"(#,g)m+
H(q)V (c,r)"g(#,g){[tk0 + m   # + (" +  )ˆ l#]
ˆ p!
n
+ m + (" +  )ˆ l!} = 0.
So, the relative valuation of second-period public good depends, among others, on the interest-
elasticity of money demand, the elasticity of capital and the inßation-elasticity of savings. Let
19also ˆ $s
w =  wˆ sw
s be the future-income-elasticity of savings. We, then, have:
Proposition: A necessary and su cient condition for capital taxes to be too high, given
inßation and past public good provision, is that policies can be pre-committed upon and
 gV  Vc 
 gV
>   + !y
( +!)m




Proof: Consider Þrst discretionary policies. (19) then implies that Wt has the opposite
sign of tk0+(m ")( gV  Vc ). But from the Þrst-order condition with respect to inßation we
have that  gV  Vc  = Vc  > 0. So, given also our assumption that governments do not run a
surplus, i.e. d = "   m ! 0, we have that Wt > 0. Turn now to the case of pre-commitment.
Eliminating m from (19) by using (17) results in Wt = (n   1){k(Vc    V  g)   V  gtk0  
V  g(# +$)lt}. Using the fact that lt =  my[k  st(1+$)] and st =  ksw, we have that Wt is
proportional to    
 gV  Vc 
 gV + !y
( +!)m




This Proposition emphasises that the net direction of capital tax externalities depends,
among others, on whether governments can pre-commit, on the price elasticities of capital and
money demand (the latter a!ects the relative valuation of public good), and on the income
elasticity of money demand. SpeciÞcally, if policies are discretionary, the tax competition (net
of debt) e!ect dominates the seignorage e!ect and taxes are too low. If, on the other hand,
policies can be pre-committed upon, we have that, for given relative valuation of the public
good, the less elastic capital is, the more likely is that capital taxes are too high.30 Also, given
1   !s
w
s(1+!)
w = 1 + sw(1 + $) > 0, we have, after noting that in equilibrium y = k + f(k)   g
+ (# + $)m with k + f(k)   g = c > 0, that: the less sensitive to income money demand is,
the more income-elastic savings are, the lower seignorage is, the lower public spending is, the
higher the GDP is and the higher the ratio of savings income to non-capital income, the more
likely is that capital taxes are too high.
To gain some insight on the implications of this Proposition, assume that regional gov-
ernments can pre-commit. Let us also focus on a very simple case. Namely, suppose that
savings do not depend on inßation, i.e. s  = 0, and that money demand is relatively inelas-
tic with respect to the money’s real interest rate %, for any given price of liquidity z. One
can then very easily see, from the Þrst-order condition with respect to the inßation tax, that
30The above Proposition investigates only local welfare improvements, and abstains from a global comparison
between equilibrium and Pareto e cient policies. The reason is that the presence of three policy instruments,
capital tax, Þrst-period public good and inßation, considerably complicates a global analysis.
20 gV  Vc 
 gV = !z + Vr 
 gV > !z, where !z is the price elasticity of the demand for liquidity,  
 +!
m mz.
Using the condition that determines the demand for money, (7), and re-arranging we have that
the inßation-policy rule becomes Vc 
 gV
1+!
1   = 1   !z. Hence, in equilibrium we have
V  g  Vc
V  g =
1    Vc
V  g = 1   (1   !z)1  
1+!. So, in the simple case we focus here, taxes are too low under
monetary autonomy if   + !y
( +!)m








Importantly, this condition might hold in reality, despite the fact that seignorage in many
developed countries is a very small proportion of GDP. Take, for instance, the example of United
States used in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). Using an estimate of 0.25 for the elasticity of
capital with respect to the user-cost of capital (by Chirinko et al. (1999)), and supposing a
tax-inclusive tax rate t/$ = 0.2 - which is in line with the calculation of the e!ective marginal
tax by Chennells and Gri"th (1997) - we can estimate the value of 0.04 for the tax-elasticity
 . In addition, using an estimation of (cash-ßow deÞnition of) seignorage m as a proportion
to GDP equal to 1%, total tax receipts as a proportion of GDP equal to 29,6% (from OECD
statistics for the year 2003), and price of liquidity of 2% we can calculate (#+$)m/y = 0.00028.
Furthermore, using an estimate of 1/2 for the share of capital income to non-capital income
we have that
(1+!)s
w = 0.5. Using also nominal interest rates of 3%, we have that
 +!
1   = 0,03
and capital taxes will be too high if {[0.04+!y0.00028[1 !s
w(0.5)]}(1.03)   0.03 < !z. Notice
that the left hand side is decreasing in the future-income elasticity of savings and increasing
in the income-elasticity of money demand. Given that empirical studies have found interest
elasticities between zero and 0.5 and income elasticities between 0.5 and 1, of money demand,31
these calculations suggest that too high taxes in the presence of seignorage may not be a mere
theoretical curiosum.32
5 Extensions
In this Section we discuss some of our assumptions. In particular, we investigate how Wt in
(19) is a!ected by relaxing some of our earlier assumptions. By doing so, we thus examine how
sensitive the direction and the size of the overall capital tax externality is to the particular
31See, for instance, the survey by Goldfeld and Sichel (1990), and Walsh (2003) pp. 58 for reports of some
more recent estimates.
32Note that (1 + i)(1    ) = 1 + ! where i is the nominal interest rate. So ! +   = (1    ) i = (1 + !)i /
(1 +i) and "z = [ (i#m)/(m#i)] (1 +i). Also, for small inßation and nominal interest rates we have !+   ' i.
21assumptions we have deployed, like available taxes and endogeneity of factors of production.
We start with the case of taxable returns to the immobile factors at a rate   > 0. In this
case the government’s budget constraint becomes gj = tjkj +  wj + (! + ")mj   (1 + ")#j,
and disposable income decreases by  wj. As the case of unrestricted lump-sum tax has been
analysed in Section 3, we focus here on an environment where the lump-sum tax   faces an
upper-bound which is lower than its optimal unrestricted level. So, capital and money-holdings
taxes are still used. Following similar steps to the ones in the previous Section one can then
easily see that Wt, in (19), increases by (1 1/n)ˆ pt kH(Vc  V  g). This term represents the
net externality that arises, due to taxation of the returns to the immobile factors, from the
e!ect on disposable income (and hence private consumption) and rent tax revenues abroad of
tax-induced changes in the real interest rate. To understand this term, note that the marginal
e!ect on disposable income of an increase in price of capital, in a symmetric equilibrium, is
s   (1    )k = # +  k > #. As interest rates decrease with the capital tax, we thus have
that an increase in the capital tax decreases disposable income by more than  ˆ pt# as long as
the returns to the immobile factors are taxed. As consumption is valued, we have that this
constitutes a negative externality which leaves, all other things equal, taxes too high. Similarly,
the marginal e!ect on public revenues from taxation of the returns to the immobile factors of
a change in price of capital, in a symmetric equilibrium, is   k < 0. As interest rates decrease
with the capital tax, we have that an increase in the capital tax increases revenues from taxing
the returns to the immobile factor. As revenues are valued, we have that this constitutes
a positive externality, which leads, ceteris paribus, to under-taxation of capital. These two
horizontal externalities that arise due to the taxation of returns to immobile factor have also
been identiÞed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) in a model with no money. Clearly, the
direction of the net horizontal externality that arises due to constrained taxation of immobile
factors depends on the relative marginal valuation of private and public consumptions.
However, the taxation of the returns to the immobile factors reinforces also the seignor-
age e ect. This is a direct consequence of the fact that now a tax-induced decrease in the
equilibrium real interest rate decreases further disposable income. So, taxation of returns to
immobile factor makes money demand even less negatively responsive to the interest rate. In
particular, now we have that in a symmetric equilibrium ˆ l  = ˆ mz + ˆ my[# + ˆ s (1 + ")] + ˆ my e
> ˆ mz + ˆ my[# + ˆ s (1 + ")].
Next, we consider the implications of the immobile factor being endogenous. In partic-
22ular, assume that the production function is homogenous of degree one. Let, with a slight
abuse of notation, f be the intensive form representation of this technology. Now k is the
capital stock as a proportion of the immobile factor L; that is, capital is equal to kL. Refer-
ring, for brevity, to the endogenous immobile factor as labour, w is now the wage rate and
  is the labour income tax rate. Let also utility be H(q)"(#   L,c,m(1   !)) (#,g), where
# is the time endowment, $ = #   L is leisure and "! > 0, "!! < 0. In this case, the
wealth hj is equal to hj = (1 + ")e + (1    )wj# = h("," + tj, ) and the budget constraint is
(# Lj)(1  )wj+(1+")qj+cj+mj(!+") = hj. Let %j ! (1  )wj denote the after-tax-wage.
Assuming that leisure is a normal good, that Þrst-period consumption and leisure are gross
substitutes and that money and leisure are gross substitutes,33 standard consumer theory then
tells us that labour supply in jurisdiction j is given by a function L(",!+",hj,%j) with L  < 0,
Lh < 0, Lz < 0 and L" > 0. Normalise units for clarity so that # = 1. Note that the e!ect on
labour supply of changes in the net wage has the sign of Lh+L", which captures the balance of
the usual income and substitution e!ects. That is, labour supply is upward sloping if and only
if Lh + L" > 0. Let us denote with ˜ L  the total e!ect on labour supply of a marginal increase
in the real interest rate ", i.e. ˜ L  = L + Lz + Lh[e (1  )k]   L"(1  )k, and with Lt the
e!ect on labour supply of a marginal change in the capital tax, i.e. Lt =  [Lh + L"](1    )k.
Clearly, then, when labour supply is upward sloping we have that ˜ L  < 0 and Lt " 0.
Following similar steps to the ones in the previous Section,34 and after assuming, for
expositional, and only, clarity, that in the non-cooperative equilibrium L = 1, one can easily
see that our discussion above about the implications of taxing the returns to the (endogenous
now) immobile factor are still valid. Relative to that case, then, endogeneity of labour and
availability of a labour income tax imply that Wt has the additional term (1 1/n)ˆ ptH(q)"(1 
L,c,m(1   !))[tk +  w]˜ L  > 0. To understand this term, note that with endogenous labour
an increase in capital taxes leads, through a decrease in the interest rate, to higher labour
33The latter assumption can be motivated with reference to the role of money as means of reducing shopping
time. A decrease in money holdings would lead to more time spent for shopping, and this would raise the
marginal utility of leisure, i.e.   ! < 0. See also Walsh (2003) pp. 65.
34Now in a symmetric equilibrium L(!,  + !,h,(1   $)w(k(! + t)))k(! + t) = s(!,t, )   %. So, the interest
rate now depends also on the income tax rate, and pt in the main text denotes, with some abuse of notation,
the change in the interest rate of the symmetric equilibrium due to a marginal change in the capital tax. Note
that still pt < 0.
23supply and capital stock, and thereby higher, capital and labour income, tax revenues in the
other jurisdictions (see also Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991)). So, the tax competition e!ect is
reinforced.
However, now, changes in the labour supply a!ect also disposable income and thereby
demand for money. To see the implications, note Þrst that disposable income now is yj =
(1+")sj+(1  )wjLj. Next, suppose, for expositional clarity, that utility "(1 L,c,m(1 !))
is separable in leisure, i.e. "(1 L,c,m(1 !)) = ˆ "(1 L)V (c,m(1 !)) (g). It follows that
money demand is still given by the function m(!j + ",yj,1   !j). However, we now have that
l  = mz + my[ e + # + s (1 + ")] + my(1    )w˜ L  < mz + my[ e + # + s (1 + ")]. That
is, endogeneity of labour leads, ceteris paribus, to too low taxes - relative to the case of the
internationally immobile factor being exogenous and taxable at a rate  ; the reason is that with
endogenous labour an increase in capital taxes leads, through a decrease in the interest rate,
to higher labour supply and thereby, all other things equal, disposable income, money demand
and seignorage in the other jurisdictions. So the seignorage e!ect is dampened.
With endogenous labour, one may also wonder what are the e$ciency properties of an
endogenous labour income tax  . In fact, if tax authorities can choose freely income taxes, one
can very easily see that an externality emerges. This externality works through the negative
e!ect of income taxes on the interest rate ". Essentially, this externality is qualitatively similar
to the net externality that emerges from the e!ect of capital taxes on the interest rate, which
we have discussed above.
What is crucial for our results is that real money balances are increasing with disposable
income and, for any given income, decreasing with the real interest rate ". These would also
be the characteristics, in any equilibrium with positive nominal interest rate, of a demand for
liquidity due to a cash-in-advance constraint mj(1 !j) # cj. This is the most popular variant
of liquidity constraints, requiring that money holdings must be at least as high as the value
of purchases.35 Thereby deploying a cash-in-advance model would not a!ect qualitatively the
35If ! +  j > 0 then holding money is costly. If real money balances provide no utility, i.e. if Vr = Vcr ! 0,
then the cash-in-advance constraint binds. It follows, then, from the budget constraint that mj = yj/(1 + !).
After using the deÞnition of disposable income, we can see that real money holdings are decreasing with both
the real interest rate and the capital tax. Note, furthermore, that money holdings are independent of inßation.
Introducing such dependence can be achieved by postulating that bonds are credit goods that can provide
some liquidity (see, for instance, Lucas and Stokey, 1987). In this case, the cash-in-advance constraint becomes
24main insights of our paper.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that taxes on mobile capital may not be too low when governments have
access to seignorage. Our explanation is based on a simple ingredient: capital taxes provide
an externality by a!ecting the revenues of foreign central banks from issuing currency. This
externality may lead, ceteris paribus, to too high national capital taxes. This additional e!ect,
of capital taxes, may more than o!set the usual e!ects of tax competition. In this case, and
contrary to conventional wisdom, non-cooperative capital taxes will be too high.
In fact, we emphasise that the relative strength of the various e!ects depends on the
interest-elasticity of the demands for capital and real money balances, on income-elasticity of
money demand, on the extend to which countries exploit immobile factors, on the respon-
siveness of labour supply to changes in the interest rate, on the responsiveness of savings to
changes in the future-income, on the level of seignorage and total tax receipts, and on whether
policies are discretionary. Future research that incorporates, for instance, asymmetric regions
or foreign ownership of the Þxed production factor will improve our understanding of capital
tax competition in the presence of seignorage.
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